

INSTONE – FOUNDATIONS FOR A GOOD LIFE.

# Remuneration Report 2024

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## Remuneration Report 🔗 GRI 2-19, 2-20, 2-21

In accordance with the statutory requirements and the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) in the version published in the German Federal Gazette on 27 June 2022, this remuneration report explains the remuneration systems and remuneration for the Management Board and Supervisory Board of Instone Real Estate Group SE. In doing so, it also takes into account the requirements of the German Accounting Standard No. 17 (DRS) and the HGB.

### I. Remuneration System for the Members of the Management Board of Instone Real Estate Group SE

The current remuneration system for the members of the Management Board of Instone Real Estate Group SE was approved by the Supervisory Board in the 2021 financial year and submitted to the Annual General Meeting of the company held on 9 June 2021, which approved the remuneration system described in this number I, which came into force as from 1 July 2021, with 98.27% voting to approve it. The full remuneration system can be found under [🔗 Remuneration of the Management Board](#).

The remuneration system is geared towards sustainable and long-term corporate development. Transparency and traceability of the remuneration system and the individual remuneration of the Management Board members are key components of good corporate governance at Instone Real Estate Group SE.

The remuneration system applies for a maximum period of four years to all new contract of employment concluded with members of the Management Board and for contract extensions and adjustments from 1 July 2021. Therefore, the employment contracts of members of the Management Board in place on the date on which the remuneration system came into force have been revised with effect from 1 July 2021 in accordance with the provisions and regulations of the new remuneration system. Remuneration claims established before 1 July 2021, including those relating to variable remuneration, therefore continue to be based on the contractual provisions on which they were based at the time.

The main components of the remuneration system are as follows:

TABLE 116

Remuneration component	Component	Weighting/Description
<b>Non-performance related emoluments</b>  (Approx. 40% of target remuneration)	Basic remuneration	Payable annually in twelve equal instalments at the end of each month
	Fringe benefits	Include, for example, use of a company car, accident insurance premiums and reimbursement of other expenses for board activities
<b>Short-term performance-based emoluments – short-term incentive (STI)</b>  (Approx. 25% of target remuneration)	Financial objective: EAT (adjusted)	37.5% of the STI bonus base amount as measured by the economic performance in the underlying financial year
	Financial objective: Volume of sales contracts	37.5% of the STI bonus base amount as measured by performance in the underlying financial year
	Strategy and sustainability goals (Number: two to four)	25% of the STI bonus base amount as measured by the target achievement in the underlying financial year
	Payment	In each case, based on the targets set by the Supervisory Board in the month following the audited annual financial statements
<b>Long-term performance-based emoluments – long-term incentive (LTI)</b>  (Approx. 35% of target remuneration)	Performance share plan (financial targets and non-financial ESG target)	Virtual stock tranche paid out after the end of a three-year performance period based on the achievement of the targets set by the Supervisory Board in advance and set out below
	Financial objective: Relative TSR (Instone Group share price development including dividends)	20% of the LTI bonus base amount as measured by comparing the Total Shareholder Return of the Instone Group (Instone Group share price performance including dividends) during the three-year performance period for the development of the SDAX (Performance Index)
	Financial objective: Earnings per share (EPS target)	50% of the LTI bonus base amount as measured by the development of adjusted earnings per share during the three-year performance period
	Non-financial ESG target	30% of the LTI bonus base amount as measured by the Target achievement during the three-year performance period
	Payment	At the end of a total of three years in euros in the month following the adoption of the annual financial statements, for each tranche based on the development of the Instone Group share price during the three-year performance period, including dividends (total shareholder return approach)
<b>Caps/maximum remuneration</b>	STI cap	200% of the STI bonus base amount
	Maximum LTI payout factor	300% of LTI target achievement
	LTI cap limit	300% of the LTI bonus base amount
	Maximum remuneration	€3.1 million for Chair of the Management Board (CEO) €2.35 million each for other members of the Management Board
<b>Shareholding obligation/ Share Ownership Guideline</b>	Minimum holding position of the members of the Management Board in Instone Group shares	Obligation to hold Instone Group shares in the equivalent of a non-performance-related basic salary (gross) for the entire term of the contract. The equivalent value is based on the purchase price of the shares. If the shareholding obligation is not met at the start of the term of the contract, it must be achieved during the term of the contract by means of appropriate purchases.
<b>Malus/clawback regulations</b>		Retention and/or recovery of variable remuneration components in the event of a violation of statutory or contractual obligations or internal codes of conduct

## A. Contribution of remuneration to supporting the business strategy and the long-term development of the company

The calculation of the remuneration is mainly based on the size and complexity of the Instone Group, its economic situation and financial position, and its success and future prospects. Other material criteria for setting the remuneration include the duties and personal performance of the individual members of the Management Board. The remuneration system defines remuneration that is competitive in national and international comparison, which creates added value for customers, employees, shareholders and other stakeholders by defining performance criteria relating in particular to the long-term and sustainable success of the company and linking them with challenging targets. These targets set by the Supervisory Board for variable remuneration are in line with the corporate strategy and ensure the synchronisation of the remuneration of the Management Board and the long-term development of the company through a link with corporate planning.

## B. Procedures for Determining and Implementing the Remuneration of the Management Board and for Reviewing the Remuneration System

Responsibility for preparing the remuneration system, setting the actual total emoluments of the individual members of the Management Board and the regular review of the remuneration system lies with the Supervisory Board of Instone Real Estate Group SE. The Supervisory Board has set up a remuneration committee, which is responsible, in particular, for advising on the contracts of employment of the members of the Management Board, preparing the relevant resolutions and preparing the setting of targets for the variable remuneration components and their assessment by the Supervisory Board. The Supervisory Board reviews the remuneration system at regular intervals on the basis of the preparations and recommendations of the remuneration committee. If the Supervisory Board identifies a need for action, it decides on the changes deemed necessary and, if they are significant, submits the remuneration system to the Annual General Meeting again for approval.

The Supervisory Board may call on external consultants to help it fulfil its duties and they must be independent of the Management Board and Instone Real Estate Group SE. The Supervisory Board has in fact done so for the preparation of the current remuneration system. The rules of procedure

of the Supervisory Board contain provisions for dealing with potential conflicts of interest in the Supervisory Board, which include disclosure of potential conflicts of interest to the Chair of the Supervisory Board, a ban on participating and voting in the event of identified conflicts of interest and also apply to remuneration matters.

The Annual General Meeting shall decide on the remuneration system in the event of any significant change to the remuneration system but at least every four years. If the Annual General Meeting has not approved the remuneration system, a revised remuneration system must be submitted for approval to the next Annual General Meeting at the latest.

## C. Determination and Appropriateness of Remuneration

In keeping with the remuneration system, the Supervisory Board has set the total target remuneration and relevant upper remuneration limits (caps) for each member of the Management Board. The remuneration is proportionate to the duties and performance of the Management Board member and to the situation of the Instone Group, will not exceed the usual remuneration without special reasons and is geared toward the long-term and sustainable development of the Instone Group. The appropriateness of the remuneration is regularly reviewed by the Supervisory Board. Both external and internal comparison analyses are carried out for this purpose.

### Consideration of employee remuneration and employment conditions and peer group comparison

The internal analysis was carried out as part of the preparation of the current remuneration system in the form of a vertical comparison of the remuneration and employment conditions of employees. The remuneration levels of the members of the Management Board were set in relation to the remuneration levels of the senior management and the workforce as a whole. The distinction between these two groups of employees was made by the Supervisory Board. The senior management includes the managing directors of the subsidiaries and the workforce as a whole is made up of the full-time employees of the Instone Group in Germany (including senior management). The results of the vertical comparison were taken into account in determining the remuneration system and are taken into account for future adjustments to the remuneration level of the Management Board – including its development over time.

To develop the remuneration system and check the appropriateness of the remuneration conditions, the Supervisory Board also carried out an external comparative analysis of remuneration levels using two peer groups (industry and growth peer groups). The members of the industry peer group were selected on the basis of six criteria (company size, sector, in other words direct competitors or companies in other sectors with comparable characteristics – in particular real estate, land, legal form, equity market basis and relevant labour markets) on the premise that they are as comparable as possible with Instone Real Estate Group SE. Due to the considerable growth of the Instone Group since the IPO, a second growth peer group was also formed, which is comparable with Instone Real Estate Group SE in terms of sales growth rates, company size and region.

## D. Remuneration components

The total remuneration of the individual members of the Management Board consists of various components. In terms of structure, the remuneration components for all members of the Management Board are regulated in the same way using estimates, since the amount of fringe benefits in particular may vary as part of the performance-independent remuneration:

TABLE 117	
Annual target remuneration	100%
– of which <b>non-performance related</b> emoluments	approx. 40%
– of which <b>performance-based</b> emoluments – <b>short-term (STI)</b>	approx. 25%
– of which <b>performance-based</b> emoluments – <b>long-term (LTI)</b>	approx. 35%

The remuneration of the Management Board consists of non-performance-related salary and benefits in kind, performance-related (variable) remuneration and (in the case of two Management Board members) pension commitments agreed before their appointment to the Management Board, for which the additions by the company up to 2020 correspond to an annual pension benefit from the age of 65, which is expected to be between 3% and 5% of the current annual non-performance-related basic remuneration. Variable remuneration is based on a multi-year assessment basis in order to create incentives for sustainable and long-term corporate development. The remuneration system explicitly stipulates that both positive and negative developments are taken into account. The Supervisory Board also sets a maximum amount (cap) for each variable remuneration component. Management Board remuneration is highly performance-dependent, with a particular focus on long-term variable remuneration.

Therefore, the STI bonus amounts to approximately 62.5% for achieving 100% of the targets and approximately 125% of the non-performance related remuneration for achieving the maximum targets. Due to its even greater weighting, the LTI bonus amounts to approximately 87.5% of the non-performance-related remuneration in the event of 100% target achievement and approximately 262.5% in the event of maximum target achievement.

In principle, this remuneration covers all activities for the company and for those companies affiliated with the company under Sections 15 et seqq. German Stock Corporation Act. [GRI 2-21](#)

## Non-performance related emoluments

The members of Instone Real Estate Group SE's Management Board receive non-performance-related emoluments in the form of a fixed base annual salary (base remuneration) and fringe benefits. The fixed annual base salary is paid in twelve equal instalments at the end of a month, and for the last time for the full month in which the Management Board employment contract ends.

The members of the Management Board also receive non-performance-related fringe benefits. These include, for example, the use of a company car and the payment of premiums for accident insurance with payments at a standard market level and are taken into consideration in the maximum remuneration of the Management Board.

## Performance-based emoluments

The performance-based remuneration components consist of a variable remuneration element with a (one-year) short-term incentive [STI] and a variable remuneration element with a multi-year assessment basis (long-term incentive [LTI]). Due to the design of the components, the share of the LTI outweighs the share of the STI in the target remuneration.

If the Management Board member is not entitled to remuneration for the entire financial year underlying the calculation, a corresponding pro rata reduction of this variable remuneration component is made.


## One-Year Variable Remuneration – Short-Term Incentive (STI)

The one-year variable remuneration in the form of the STI is linked to

- the financial result or performance of the Instone Group in the underlying financial year (financial targets) and
- the strategy and sustainability goals defined for the individual members of the Management Board.

### Variable compensation – STI

FIGURE 020



The financial targets set out in the STI, which account for a total of 75% of the STI bonus base amount, are made up of earnings after tax (**EAT [adjusted]**) and the **volume of sales contracts**, both being weighted identically with 37.5% each. Both the EAT (adjusted) and the volume of sales contracts are key operating financial and management figures and performance indicators of the Instone Group and are part of the company's forecast. Both financial targets are therefore decisive for the corporate strategy of the Management Board and the long-term development of the Instone Group. In the view of the Supervisory Board, the measurement of short-term variable remuneration on the basis of these key operating financial and management figures and performance indicators seems appropriate in order to ensure that the Management Board is incentivised to implement the corporate strategy. The EAT (adjusted) result-based key figure is also the benchmark for the dividend policy. The real estate business key performance indicators of the volume of sales contracts includes all sales-related transactions, such as notarised real estate purchase agreements, individual orders from customers and rental income. Both financial targets are derived from the corporate planning prepared by

the Management Board and approved by the Supervisory Board and the forecast, and are set uniformly for the Management Board for each bonus year. The EAT (adjusted) and the volume of sales contracts are determined on the basis of the adjusted results of operations on which the financial reporting of Instone Real Estate Group SE is based and which is explained in more detail in the management report on [page 104 et seqq.](#)

The linking of the one-year variable remuneration with these key financial and management figures of the Instone Group serves to ensure profitable and sustainable growth. In addition, the selection of these targets provides incentives for the Management Board to act in accordance with the corporate strategy and the planning approved by the Supervisory Board or to exceed the forecast communicated to the capital market in the best case scenario.

The **strategy and sustainability targets relevant for the relevant bonus year** are set individually by the Supervisory Board for each bonus year and for each member of the Management Board. The Supervisory Board usually sets two to four targets for each member of the Management Board which serve to implement corporate strategy and long-term corporate development. The strategy and sustainability targets are included in the STI bonus at 25%. This gives the Supervisory Board the opportunity to define central, not necessarily financial targets for the Management Board in the company's interest and to link them to the personal performance of the Management Board members. These targets may include environmental concerns such as CO<sub>2</sub> reduction, customer and employee satisfaction, the value of investor sales or the improvement of corporate financing as well as the promotion and development of the new nyoo product line (affordable housing) or the construction of subsidised housing. To ensure sufficient transparency and traceability of the achievement of objectives, the Supervisory Board ensures that targets are set or criteria defined for the targets, the achievement of which can ideally be determined and measured using quantitative methods. The Supervisory Board can weigh the annual strategy and sustainability targets differently, whereby each individual target must be weighted with a minimum of at least 25% within the strategy and sustainability targets.


An STI bonus base amount in euros is agreed for each member of the Management Board in their contract of employment. The payment amount of this variable remuneration component is set depending on the achievement of the targets for which the Supervisory Board sets the target or threshold values to be achieved for each performance period, then as follows:

- At the end of the relevant bonus year (performance period), the Supervisory Board defines the target achievement for each individual target and converts the target achievement into an overall target achievement, taking into account the weighting of all the individual targets. The maximum target achievement for each individual STI target is capped at 175%.
- The overall target achievement is assigned to an STI payout factor using the bonus curve, [figure 021](#). If the overall target achievement falls below 75% (**lower target limit**), there is no entitlement to a payment of the STI bonus. Due to the ambitious target setting, above-average performance by the members of the Management Board is disproportionately rewarded: If the overall target achievement is 150% or more (**upper target limit**), the STI payout factor is 200%. The STI payout factor for an overall target achievement of between 100% and 150% is calculated on a proportional basis. If the overall target achievement is between 75% and 100%, the STI payout factor corresponds to the overall target achievement on a linear basis.
- The STI payout factor is multiplied by the agreed STI bonus base amount and thus results in the payout amount of the STI bonus in euros for the performance period. The payout amount may reach a maximum of 200% of the STI bonus base amount (**cap**). The payment is made in the month following approval of the audited annual financial statements of the company.

Below is an example of the overall goal achievement at STI and the resulting STI payout factor:

Bonus curve - overall target achievement

FIGURE 021




## Multi-year variable remuneration (long-term incentive (LTI))

Another component of variable remuneration is that the members of the Management Board are also promised multi-year variable remuneration in the form of an LTI bonus on the basis of a share-based virtual performance share plan. By linking the share price of Instone Group shares, incentives are provided for the Management Board to promote the long-term and sustainable development of the Instone Group. It also strengthens the alignment of interests between shareholders and the Management Board.

Variable compensation - LTI

FIGURE 022



The amount of any LTI bonus depends on:

- The amount of the LTI bonus base amount and the average share price used as a basis at the time of the allocation of the virtual share tranche in financial year 0, in other words the financial year before the start of the three-year performance period,
- Achieving financial targets and non-financial ESG targets during a three-year performance period, and
- The share price performance (taking into account dividends) of Instone Real Estate Group SE during the three-year performance period.

The assessment period for the multi-year variable remuneration is therefore a total of three years.

The financial targets set out in the LTI are the development of the adjusted earnings per share (EPS) (**EPS target**) and the total shareholder return ([TSR] share price performance taking into account dividends) of Instone Real Estate Group SE compared to the SDAX (**relative TSR**), representing a total of 70% of the LTI bonus base amount and weighted at 50% and 20% respectively. Both financial targets are derived from the corporate planning prepared by the Management Board and approved by the Supervisory Board and the forecast, and are set uniformly for the Management Board for each three-year performance period.

The EPS target sets a target by which the Management Board is incentivised to increase the long-term profitability of the company on the basis of the multi-year performance period. This creates an incentive to manage the company for profit while at the same time generating long-term sustainable growth in the interest of the shareholders. The EPS target is set in the form of an aggregated target value over the performance period. The EPS target is calculated on the basis of the adjusted results of operations on which the financial reporting of Instone Real Estate Group SE is based and which is explained in more detail in the management report on [page 104 et seqq.](#)

The **relative TSR** provides an incentive for the Management Board to deliver above-average performance compared to other listed companies. The development of the share price also reflects the increase in the value of the company from the shareholder's point of view. The Supervisory Board

considers the SDAX, which consists of companies of a comparable size and in which the Instone Group share was listed until the end of the last financial year, to be an appropriate benchmark. However, since the Instone Group share is currently no longer listed in the SDAX or in the event that the SDAX is subject to significant changes or that other developments occur that no longer make a reference to the SDAX appear appropriate, the Supervisory Board may also choose another suitable share index as a reference value for the remuneration system.

The Supervisory Board also sets a non-financial **ESG** (environmental, social and governance) **target**, which accounts for 30% of the LTI bonus base amount. The ESG target, which is set uniformly for each annual LTI tranche granted to all members of the Management Board, is intended to encourage the sustainable development of the Instone Group in accordance with the company's ESG strategy. The Supervisory Board will define a target that is in line with the interests of the company's stakeholders and is geared toward achieving a long-term, three-year target. The measurement of the target achievement is ideally designed to be quantifiable.

An LTI bonus base amount in euros is agreed for each member of the Management Board in their contract of employment. This is divided by the average volume-weighted Instone Group share price of the last three months of the financial year before the start of the performance period to determine a provisional tranche of virtual shares allocated to the relevant Management Board member (**base number**). The payment amount of this variable remuneration component is set depending on the achievement of the targets for which the Supervisory Board sets the target or threshold values to be achieved for each performance period and the share price performance of Instone Group shares, then as follows:

- At the end of the three-year performance period, the Supervisory Board decides the target achievement for each individual target.
- The target achievement for each individual target is assigned to an LTI payout factor using the bonus curve shown in [figure 024](#). Taking into account the relevant weighting of the individual target, a total payout factor is formed from the individual LTI payout factors defined in this way. Due to the ambitious target setting, above-average performance by the members of the Management Board is disproportionately rewarded: If the target achievement is 150% or more for an individual target (**upper target limit**), the relevant LTI payout factor for this individual target is 300%. The LTI payout factor for a target achievement of between 100% and 150% is calculated on a proportional basis.




If the target achievement for an individual target is 100% or less, the LTI payout factor corresponds to the relevant **target achievement** (subject to and up to a lower target limit defined by the Supervisory Board).

- To determine the relative TSR, the final price of the Instone Group share is compared to the initial price. For the purpose of smoothing out the initial and final price, the volume-weighted average of the closing prices of the Instone Group share in Xetra trading (or a comparable successor system) of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange over the previous three months is used to determine the initial and final price. The final price also takes into account distributions, including dividend payments, assuming reinvestment in Instone Group shares during the performance period. For the calculation of the development of the SDAX (as a performance index), the initial value is the arithmetic mean of the closing balances in the SDAX of the last three months before the beginning of the relevant performance period and the final value is the arithmetic mean of the closing balances of the SDAX over the last three months of the relevant three-year performance period. The target achievement for the relative TSR and the pro rata LTI payout factor is 100% if, at the end of the performance period, the development of the share price (including dividend payments, assuming reinvestment in Instone Group shares during the performance period) of the Instone Group share corresponds to the development of the SDAX. If the target achievement for the relative TSR is less than 75%, this target is considered to have been missed and is cancelled, see [figure 023](#).
- The base number of virtual shares is multiplied by the total payout factor and the average volume-weighted share price of the last three months prior to the end of the last financial year of the performance period, taking into account dividend payments and assuming reinvestment in Instone Group shares during the performance period (total shareholder return approach) in order to equate the Management Board with a real shareholder. The payment is made after the end of the performance period in the month following approval of the audited annual financial statements of the company.

The following is an example of the bonus curves for the relative TSR target, [figure 023](#), and for calculating the additional LTI payout factors (EPS target and ESG target), [figure 024](#):


Bonus curve - relative TSR

FIGURE 023



Bonus curve - LTI payout factors

FIGURE 024



In the event of an extraordinary development in the share price, the Supervisory Board is entitled to take into account a reasonable longer period before the end of the relevant bonus year for calculating the average closing price. If capital measures lead to a reduction or increase in the number of Instone Group shares (for example, share splits or share consolidation), this effect is taken into account by means of suitable calculations when determining the target achievement and its effect is neutralised.

The payout amount of the LTI bonus is capped at an amount corresponding to 300% of the LTI bonus base amount (LTI cap).

### Share Ownership Guideline

To strengthen long-term development and encourage the investment of the Management Board in Instone Real Estate Group SE, the members of the Management Board are obliged by a share ownership guideline to complete a four-year development phase by acquiring shares in Instone Real Estate Group SE in the amount of a gross annual salary that is independent of their performance and holding them for the entire term of their Management Board contract. This four-year development phase starts with their appointment to the Management Board. The equivalent value is based on the purchase price of the shares. The shares already held by a member of the Management Board are added to this figure.

If the relevant Management Board member has acquired shares in the amount of a gross annual salary not dependent on performance, the ownership level must not fall below this threshold by up to 50% for a maximum period of six months.

In this case, the Management Board member is obliged to add to the number of shares held within a period of six months up to the amount of a gross annual salary that is not dependent on performance.

## E. Definition of Maximum Remuneration and Temporary Deviations from the Remuneration System

### Maximum remuneration

Under Section 87a (1) sentence 2 No. 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), the Supervisory Board has set a maximum amount for the total of all remuneration components, including fringe benefits and pension commitments. This amounts to €3.1 million for the Chair of the

Management Board (CEO) and €2.35 million for the other members of the Management Board. The maximum remuneration defined by the Supervisory Board takes into account the findings of the peer group analysis as well as the strongly performance- and growth-focused structure of the Management Board remuneration system and is intended to enable the market-based and company-specific development of the Management Board remuneration in the interest of the company.

### Temporary deviations from the remuneration system

A deviation from the remuneration system is possible on an exceptional basis for the Supervisory Board under the legal provision of Section 87a (2) sentence 2 AktG if exceptional circumstances make a deviation necessary in the interest of the long-term well-being of the company. This requires a Supervisory Board resolution that establishes the need for a deviation in a transparent and justified manner. The components of the remuneration system specifically affected by the deviation and the necessity of the deviation must also be explained to the shareholders in the remuneration report. A deviation may be made if the described requirements are satisfied, in particular from the performance criteria of the variable remuneration, the ratio of the components of the target remuneration and for exceptional fringe benefits.

## F. Opportunities for the company to reclaim variable remuneration components

The contracts of employment of Management Board members contain provisions that give the Supervisory Board discretion to retain (malus) or recover (clawback) part or all of the variable remuneration components. The requirement for the application of these regulations is grossly negligent and serious violation of statutory or contractual duties or the company's internal codes of conduct. In such cases, the Supervisory Board may, at its reasonable discretion, reduce and retain variable remuneration components that have not yet been paid out or demand repayment of variable remuneration components that have already been paid out. The aforementioned claims shall lapse two years after the end of the assessment period of the relevant variable remuneration component.

## G. Remuneration-related legal transactions

### Terms and conditions for the termination of remuneration-related legal transactions

The term of the Management Board contracts runs in parallel with the term of appointment of the Management Board member as decided by the Supervisory Board. Each contract of employment has a fixed term and therefore does not contain an ordinary right of termination. The right to extraordinary termination is unaffected.

### Compensation for dismissal

If the employment contract of a member of the Management Board is terminated extraordinarily by the company for good cause before the end of the term of the LTI bonus (so-called "bad leaver case"), this will result in the expiry of all rights arising from the LTI bonus which is attributable to a period before the expiry of the respective term of three years.

If the contract of employment of a Management Board member ends before the end of the term of the LTI bonus and the other requirements for a bad leaver case do not exist at the same time (so-called "good leaver case"), the entitlement to the LTI bonus from performance periods that are already ongoing and, if applicable, pro rata for the upcoming performance period will remain in force.

Special termination rights were agreed with the members of the Management Board in the event of a change of control. The members of the Management Board are entitled to a severance payment if, in addition to a change of control, the basis on which they can run the business suffers a significant adverse effect, in other words if the terminating Management Board member loses their position, the company is merged, all or a significant portion of the company's assets are transferred to third-party legal entities that do not belong to the Instone Group, a control and/or profit transfer agreement is concluded with the company as a dependent company, the legal form of the company is changed and the Management Board member thereby loses the independence granted by the German Stock Corporation Act or the SE-VO or the decision-making powers of the terminating Management Board member suffer significant adverse effect for no material reason. Under the employment contract of a Management Board member, the conclusion of a control and/or profit transfer agreement with the company as obligated parties does not qualify as a significant adverse effect in the running of the business under certain conditions. In

addition, the members of the Management Board have special termination rights in the event of dismissal due to a loss of confidence at the Annual General Meeting or resignation from office for a material reason.

In the event that a special right of termination is exercised, the terminating member of the Management Board is entitled to a severance payment in the amount of 1.5 gross annual remuneration, whereby this severance payment is reduced pro rata temporis if the remaining term of the employment contract that is less than 1.5 years. No severance claim exists if the appointment ends due to dismissal for good cause within the meaning of Section 626 of the German Civil Code (BGB) or due to good cause within the meaning of Section 84 (3) AktG, which is not based on the loss of confidence at the Annual General Meeting.

Variable remuneration components shall also be paid out in the event of premature termination of activities on the Management Board on the basis of the assessment bases originally agreed (performance targets, performance periods etc.) and due dates.

### Pension commitments

Two members of the Management Board still have a company pension plan in the form of individual contractual pension agreements which are valid after reaching the minimum pensionable age of 65 years. These two pension agreements were agreed well before the IPO or the appointment of the members entitled to benefits to the Management Board in 2008 and 1987 and will continue to be implemented.

The two members of the Management Board entitled to the pension provision are credited with the pension component for the duration of the pension commitment as part of this company pension provision model in accordance with the pension agreements with them which form the basis. This will be credited from the time they reach the age of 65 with a specific monthly payment amount, and will cumulatively reflect the respective pension entitlement under the company pension scheme. The respective amount of the monthly pension component is calculated on the basis of the monthly non-performance-related cash remuneration of the members of the Management Board entitled to the benefit, multiplied by an age factor, which maps an appropriate interest rate, and another fixed amount to be determined annually. The necessary provisions for the pension components and the resulting pension obligations are calculated annually in actuarial terms. The amount of the credited pension components decreases with the

progressive duration of the pension agreements with otherwise unchanged fixed non-performance-related emoluments. [GRI 201-3](#)

## II. Remuneration of Management Board members in the 2024 financial year

The following part of the remuneration report provides details of the specific application of the remuneration system to the members of the Management Board via the respective employment contracts concluded with them and the remuneration of the individual members of the Management Board in the 2024 financial year.

The remuneration report for the 2023 financial year was approved by the Annual General Meeting of Instone Real Estate Group SE on 5 June 2024 by more than 91% of the votes cast, so there was no reason to change the remuneration system, to question its implementation or the way in which the remuneration of the Management Board and Supervisory Board is reported. In accordance with the requirements of the German Stock Corporation Act, the Supervisory Board will resubmit the Management Board remuneration system to the 2025 Annual General Meeting for approval.

### Total remuneration

The total remuneration granted and owed to current and former members of the Management Board for the 2024 financial year within the meaning of Section 162 (1) sentence 1 AktG amounted to a total of €3,013 thousand. (previous year: €2,190 thousand). Under the explanatory memorandum to Section 162 (1) AktG, the amounts due during the reporting period and already received by the individual member of the Management Board or whose due payment has not yet been made must be stated as the remuneration granted and owed (inflows). The following table shows the total remuneration under these principles, broken down by remuneration components and individually for the current members of the Management Board for the 2024 financial year and the previous year.

### Remuneration under Section 162 (1) sentence 1 AktG

TABLE 118

In thousands of euros

	Kruno Crepulja		Dr Foruhar Madjlessi <sup>2</sup>		David Dreyfus <sup>3</sup>		Andreas Gräf	
	CEO		CFO		CFO		COO	
	2024	2023	2024	2023	2024	2023	2024	2023
Non-performance related emoluments	526	526	0	283	461	148	406	406
One-off cushion bonus	0	0	0	0	0	300	0	0
Fringe benefits <sup>1</sup>	30	30	0	4	10	3	15	15
Short-term variable remuneration (STI)	491	0	264	0	138	0	378	0
Long-term variable remuneration (LTI)	121	195	101	163	0	0	72	117
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,168</b>	<b>751</b>	<b>365</b>	<b>450</b>	<b>609</b>	<b>451</b>	<b>871</b>	<b>538</b>
Maximum remuneration	3,100	3,100	2,350	2,350	2,145	2,145	2,350	2,350

<sup>1</sup> Excluding pension costs. These are shown separately below.

<sup>2</sup> Member of the Management Board until 31 July 2023.

<sup>3</sup> Member of the Management Board since 1 September 2023.

The maximum remuneration specified by the Supervisory Board under Section 87a (1) sentence 2 No. 1 AktG for the members of the Management Board was not exceeded in the reporting year. There was no repayment or retention of variable remuneration or deviations from the remuneration system.

In the past financial year, no advances were paid to members of the Management Board and no loans were made. The members of the Management Board neither received nor were they promised benefits from third parties with regard to their activities on the Management Board in the 2024 financial year. [GRI 2-21](#)

### One-Year Variable Remuneration – Short-Term Incentive (STI)

#### STI 2023 – payment 2024

For the short-term variable remuneration granted and owed in the 2023 financial year, i.e. the STI bonus earned for the 2023 financial year and paid out in April 2024, the following [table 119](#) shows the agreed target

values and the actual value (if these can be quantified in each case), the target achievement derived from this, including the upper target limits and the corresponding STI bonus in euros for the STI targets (i) adjusted EAT, (ii) volume of sales contracts and (iii) strategy and sustainability targets.

The personal strategy and sustainability targets for the 2023 financial year included a common cost reduction target for all members of the Management Board as a sub-target. These also included an additional individual sub-target for each member of the Management Board. For

Kruno Crepulja, this was a more specific target relating to a strategic initiative being pursued, for Andreas Gräf it was a more specific target for reviewing and realigning specific sales strategies, for Dr Foruhar Madjlessi it was the further development of ICS-specific organisational structures, and for David Dreyfus it was the successful implementation of these ICS structures. Achievement of each target was assessed by considering the two sub-targets as a whole, with both sub-targets having an identical weighting of 50%.

#### STI financial year 2023 – payment 2024

TABLE 119

Board member	Target	Weighting	STI bonus base amount	Targets set for the 2023 financial year		Information on target achievement						STI bonus	
						Target upper limit			Target achievement			Payout factor (in %)	In thousands of euros
						In %	In thousands of euros	Value	In %	Value	In %		
Kruno Crepulja	EAT (adjusted)	37.5	€	45.0 million	100	€	78.8 million	175	€	48.2 million	107.1	114.2	
CEO	Volume of sales contracts	37.5	€	150.0 million	100	€	262.5 million	175	€	211.4 million	140.9	181.8	
	Strategy and sustainability goals	25		n/a	100		n/a	175		n/a	130	160	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>325</b>	<b>100</b>	€	<b>650 thousand</b>	<b>150</b>		<b>125.5</b>		<b>151</b>	<b>490.8</b>
Dr Foruhar Madjlessi <sup>1</sup>	EAT (adjusted)	37.5	€	45.0 million	100	€	78.8 million	175	€	48.2 million	107.1	114.2	
CFO	Volume of sales contracts	37.5	€	150.0 million	100	€	262.5 million	175	€	211.4 million	140.9	181.8	
	Strategy and sustainability goals	25		n/a	100		n/a	175		n/a	130	160	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>175</b>	<b>100</b>	€	<b>350 thousand</b>	<b>150</b>		<b>125.5</b>		<b>151</b>	<b>264.3</b>
David Dreyfus <sup>2</sup>	EAT (adjusted)	37.5	€	45.0 million	100	€	78.8 million	175	€	48.2 million	107.1	114.2	
CFO	Volume of sales contracts	37.5	€	150.0 million	100	€	262.5 million	175	€	211.4 million	140.9	181.8	
	Strategy and sustainability goals	25		n/a	100		n/a	175		n/a	130	160	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>92</b>	<b>100</b>	€	<b>184 thousand</b>	<b>150</b>		<b>125.5</b>		<b>151</b>	<b>138.9</b>
Andreas Gräf	EAT (adjusted)	37.5	€	45.0 million	100	€	78.8 million	175	€	48.2 million	107.1	114.2	
COO	Volume of sales contracts	37.5	€	150.0 million	100	€	262.5 million	175	€	211.4 million	140.9	181.8	
	Strategy and sustainability goals	25		n/a	100		n/a	175		n/a	130	160	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>		<b>250</b>	<b>100</b>	€	<b>500 thousand</b>	<b>150</b>		<b>125.5</b>		<b>151</b>	<b>377.5</b>

<sup>1</sup> Member of the Management Board until 31 July 2023. The STI bonus base amount shown reflects this pro rata temporis.

<sup>2</sup> Member of the Management Board since 1 September 2023. The STI bonus base amount shown reflects this pro rata temporis.

### STI 2024 - payment 2025

For the performance period of the 2024 financial year, the Supervisory Board determined the STI target achievement on 10 March 2025 and converted it into an overall target achievement, taking into account the weighting of the individual targets.

The table shows the weighting, the agreed target values and the actual value (if these can be quantified in each case), the resulting target achievement, the upper target limits and the payment factors (if applicable).

The personal strategy and sustainability targets set for the 2024 financial year included, on the one hand, the sub-target defined uniformly for all members of the Management Board of implementing business strategy

initiatives defined in greater detail and creating market access and entry for these initiatives. As in the previous year, they also included an additional individual sub-target for each member of the Management Board. For Kruno Crepulja, this consisted of developing management concepts for certain ESG topics and anchoring their implementation in the organisational structure, for Andreas Gräf it consisted of increasing the company-wide diversity ratio in the promotion of (junior) managers as part of the internal development programmes, and for David Dreyfus it consisted of developing and implementing a concept for diversifying and/or relieving the burden on the company's corporate financing in greater detail. Achievement of each target was assessed by considering the two sub-targets as a whole, with both sub-targets having an identical weighting of 50%.

### STI financial year 2024 - payment 2025

TABLE 120

Board member	Target	Weighting	STI bonus base amount	Targets set for the 2024 financial year		Information on target achievement						STI bonus	
				Target upper limit			Target achievement						
		In %	In thousands of euros	Value	In %	Value	In %	Value	In %	Payout factor (in %)	In thousands of euros		
Kruno Crepulja	EAT (adjusted)	37.5	€	35.0 million	100	€	62.3 million	175	€	36.9 million	105.4	110.8	
CEO	Volume of sales contracts	37.5	€	300.0 million	100	€	525.0 million	175	€	330.2 million	110.1	120.2	
	Strategy and sustainability goals	25.0		n/a	100		n/a	175		n/a	112.5	125.0	
	Total	100.0	325		100	€	650 thousand	150		108.9	117.9	383.1	
David Dreyfus	EAT (adjusted)	37.5	€	35.0 million	100	€	62.3 million	175	€	36.9 million	105.4	110.8	
CFO	Volume of sales contracts	37.5	€	300.0 million	100	€	525.0 million	175	€	330.2 million	110.1	120.2	
	Strategy and sustainability goals	25.0		n/a	100		n/a	175		n/a	125.6	151.3	
	Total	100.0	300		100	€	600 thousand	150		112.2	124.4	373.3	
Andreas Gräf	EAT (adjusted)	37.5	€	35.0 million	100	€	62.3 million	175	€	36.9 million	105.4	110.8	
COO	Volume of sales contracts	37.5	€	300.0 million	100	€	525.0 million	175	€	330.2 million	110.1	120.2	
	Strategy and sustainability goals	25.0		n/a	100		n/a	175		n/a	115.0	130.0	
	Total	100.0	250		100	€	500 thousand	150		109.6	119.1	297.8	

## Multi-year variable remuneration (long-term incentive (LTI))

### Allocation of the LTI 2024 – performance period 2025–2027

At the end of the 2024 financial year, the provisional tranche of virtual shares (base number) shown in the table below was allocated to the members of the Management Board on the basis of the parameters set out below for the performance period from 1 January 2025 up to and including 31 December 2027 (**LTI 2024 – performance period 2025–2027**).

The targets for the LTI 2024 are set using the existing specifications of the remuneration system. [☰ page 242 et seqq.](#)

The definition and measurement of the target achievement and the payment of the LTI 2024 – performance period 2025–2027 will take place after the end of the performance period in the 2028 financial year.

### Long-term variable remuneration (LTI)

TABLE 121

In thousands of euros

	Kruno Crepulja	David Dreyfus	Andreas Gräf
	CEO	CFO	COO
Tranche	LTI 2024-2027	LTI 2024-2027	LTI 2024-2027
LTI bonus base amount	455.0	402.5	350.0
Allocation rate (In euros)	8.77	8.77	8.77
<b>Base number (In units)</b>	<b>51,897.6</b>	<b>45,909.5</b>	<b>39,921.3</b>
LTI cap limit	1,365.0	1,207.5	1,050.0

## LTI tranches granted

The LTI tranches granted as of 31 December 2024 are shown in the table below, broken down by current and former members of the Management Board.

The LTI tranches have a performance period of three years and are only paid out upon expiry of the relevant performance period at the average closing price of Instone Group shares determined at that time.

In the case of the LTI tranches referred to as “(old)”, which were still granted under the remuneration system applicable until 30 June 2021, the basic number of virtual shares granted is multiplied by the average closing price of the Instone Group share during the last 20 trading days of the relevant term, plus any dividend paid. The payout amount calculated in this way is capped for each virtual share in the LTI tranches (old) at the amount that corresponds to 200% of the initial value determined for the relevant bonus year. For the determination of the LTI initial value at the time the LTI tranches were granted, a planned/actual comparison was made of the adjusted earnings before tax for the bonus year as well as the two previous years and virtual shares were allocated at the average price during the last 20 trading days before the end of the bonus year. During the term of the LTI tranches (old), no performance criteria are applied, so the final payout amount is therefore exclusively dependent on the share price performance of Instone Group shares.

For the LTI tranches referred to as (new), the payment is made using the outline parameters described in [☰ I.D.](#) of this remuneration report.

## LTI tranches

TABLE 122

In thousands of euros

		Basic number of virtual shares (In units)	Share price for payment (In euros)	LTI bonus (In thousands of euros)	Payment
<b>Kruno Crepulja, CEO</b>	LTI 2021-2024 (old)	8,654.8	9.85	85.2	January 2025
	LTI 2021-2024 (new)	8,132.9	8.77	82.4	in 2025
	LTI 2022-2025 (new)	57,587.7	n/a	n/a	in 2026
	LTI 2023-2026 (new)	91,733.9	n/a	n/a	in 2027
<b>Dr Foruhar Madjlessi, CFO<sup>1</sup></b>	LTI 2021-2024 (old)	7,212.4	9.85	71.1	January 2025
	LTI 2021-2024 (new)	5,675.1	8.77	57.5	in 2025
	LTI 2022-2025 (new)	47,842.1	n/a	n/a	in 2026
	LTI 2023-2026 (new)	84,677.4	n/a	n/a	in 2027
<b>David Dreyfus, CFO<sup>2</sup></b>	LTI 2021-2024 (old)	0.0	n/a	n/a	January 2025
	LTI 2021-2024 (new)	0.0	n/a	n/a	in 2025
	LTI 2022-2025 (new)	0.0	n/a	n/a	in 2026
	LTI 2023-2026 (new)	77,621.0	n/a	n/a	in 2027
<b>Andreas Gräf, COO</b>	LTI 2021-2024 (old)	5,192.9	9.85	51.2	January 2025
	LTI 2021-2024 (new)	6,256.0	8.77	63.4	in 2025
	LTI 2022-2025 (new)	44,298.3	n/a	n/a	in 2026
	LTI 2023-2026 (new)	70,564.5	n/a	n/a	in 2027

<sup>1</sup> Member of the Management Board until 31 July 2023.

<sup>2</sup> David Dreyfus has been a member of the Management Board since 1 September 2023 and will only participate in LTI Tranche 2023-2026.

## Pension commitments

The following table shows the contributions (additions) to the pension plan attributed to the individual Management Board members and the corresponding itemised cash values under the IFRSs and HGB.

### Pension commitments

TABLE 123

In thousands of euros

		2024	Allocation	2023
Kruno Crepulja (CEO)	German Commercial Code (HGB)	506.5	33.9	472.6
	IFRS	340.2	33.1	307.1
Andreas Gräf (COO)	German Commercial Code (HGB)	460.6	25.4	435.2
	IFRS	327.8	27.6	300.2
	<b>German Commercial Code (HGB)</b>	<b>967.1</b>	<b>59.3</b>	<b>907.8</b>
	<b>IFRS</b>	<b>668.0</b>	<b>60.7</b>	<b>607.3</b>

The pension obligations and the corresponding itemised cash values under the IFRS and HGB to former members of the Management Board are shown in the following table.

### Pension commitments of former members of the Management Board

TABLE 124

In thousands of euros

		2024	Allocation	2023
Pension commitments of former members of the Management Board	German Commercial Code (HGB)	1,496.4	4.9	1,491.5
	IFRS	1,119.4	36.3	1,083.1



### Share ownership guideline

The share ownership guideline agreed with all members of the Management Board was continued to be satisfied by the Management Board members in the 2024 financial year. Management Board member David Dreyfus has begun to build up the share position specified in the Management Board remuneration system. The following table shows the shareholding of the members of the Management Board as of 31 December 2024 as reported to the company:

#### Shareholding

TABLE 125

	Number of shares	Investment in registered capital in %
Kruno Crepulja (CEO)	105,775	0.225
David Dreyfus (CFO)	20,406	0.043
Andreas Gräf (COO)	50,319	0.107

### Remuneration decisions by the Supervisory Board in the 2024 financial year

In December 2024, the Supervisory Board decided to increase David Dreyfus' salary package to the remuneration level of the former CFO, Dr Foruhar Madjlessi, with effect from 1 July 2024. This decision was made on the basis of the Supervisory Board's contractual obligation to review the current level of remuneration and a corresponding recommendation by the remuneration committee, which was made after a detailed review of David Dreyfus' performance.

## III. Supervisory Board remuneration

### Remuneration system

The remuneration of the Supervisory Board is set out in Section 14 of Instone Real Estate Group SE's articles of association and is designed as a purely fixed remuneration.

On 9 June 2021, the Annual General Meeting of Instone Real Estate Group AG approved the proposal to approve the system for the remuneration of the members of the Supervisory Board, together with a resolution to amend the articles of association of Instone Real Estate Group SE, with a majority of 99.05% of the votes cast.

According to the remuneration system approved by the Annual General Meeting, Supervisory Board members receive a fixed annual remuneration of €75.0 thousand. The Chair of the Supervisory Board receives double and the Deputy Chairman one and a half times the remuneration. Members of the audit committee receive an additional remuneration in the amount of €15.0 thousand, while members of the remuneration and nomination committees shall each receive an additional €7.5 thousand per financial year for their work in these committees. The respective committee chair receives twice the remuneration. Reasonable out-of-pocket expenses are also reimbursed to the members of the Supervisory Board by the company. In addition, the company has included the members of the Supervisory Board in a D&O group insurance policy for executive bodies, for which a deductible of the members of the Supervisory Board has not been agreed. No performance-related remuneration or meeting attendance amounts are paid to Supervisory Board members.

## Supervisory Board remuneration

TABLE 126

In thousands of euros

	Remuneration for 2024 financial year (earned)			Remuneration for 2023 financial year (inflow)		
	Remuneration	Remuneration	Remuneration	Remuneration	Remuneration	Remuneration
	Role	Role		Role	Role	
	General Committee	Committees	Total	General Committee	Committees	Total
Stefan Brendgen	150.0	37.5	187.5	135.0	30.7	165.7
Dr Jochen Scharpe	112.5	37.5	150.0	101.3	33.8	135.0
Dietmar P. Binkowska	75.0	15.0	90.0	67.5	13.5	81.0
Thomas Hegel <sup>1</sup>	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.9	13.6	47.5
Christiane Jansen	75.0	7.5	82.5	67.5	6.8	74.3
Stefan Mohr	75.0	22.5	97.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sabine Georgi	75.0	0.0	75.0	33.7	0.0	33.7
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>562.5</b>	<b>120.0</b>	<b>682.5</b>	<b>438.8</b>	<b>98.3</b>	<b>537.1</b>

<sup>1</sup> Member of the Supervisory Board until 14 June 2023.

If a member of the Supervisory Board does not belong to the Supervisory Board or to a committee for the entire financial year, their remuneration is reduced pro rata temporis.

### Remuneration of the members of the Supervisory Board during the 2024 financial year

The total remuneration of the Supervisory Board in the 2024 financial year was €682.5 thousand (previous year: €645.2 thousand). Of which, €562.5 thousand (previous year: €525.1 thousand) was remuneration for work on the general committee. Remuneration for work in committees amounted to €120 thousand (previous year: €121.0 thousand). [table 126](#) above shows the remuneration paid to the members of the Supervisory Board under Section 162 (1) sentence 1 AktG, in other words the remuneration (inflows) granted and owed for the activities in the 2023 financial year, paid in the first quarter of 2024, and the remuneration earned for the activities of the Supervisory Board in the 2024 financial year is reported on an individual basis.

As a representative of the company's largest individual shareholder, Stefan Mohr voluntarily waived his remuneration for his work on the company's Supervisory Board and its committees.

In the 2024 financial year, the companies of the Instone Group did not pay or grant any remuneration or other benefits to members of the Supervisory Board for services rendered in a personal capacity, in particular advisory and agency services. Nor were members of the Supervisory Board granted any advances or credits. [GRI 2-21](#)

## V. Vertical comparison

The following table provides a comparison of the annual change in remuneration, the earnings development of the company and the average remuneration of employees on a full-time equivalent basis over the last five financial years under Section 162 (1) sentence 2 No. 2 AktG.

The remuneration of the Management Board members on which the vertical comparison is based was determined on the basis of remuneration granted/owed under Section 162 (1) AktG. All employees employed in the entire period from 1 January to 31 December are considered to be the relevant comparison group of employees in accordance with the definition in Section 267 (5) HGB of the Instone Group in Germany. The average remuneration for this comparison group was calculated on the basis of remuneration paid, taking into account the employment rate.

### Vertical comparison

TABLE 127

Changes in %

Comparison period	2020 vs. 2019	2021 vs. 2020	2022 vs. 2021	2023 vs. 2022	2024 vs. 2023
<b>Management Board members</b>					
Kruno Crepulja	0	-14	89	-44	55
Dr.Foruhar Madjllessi <sup>1</sup>	115	-23	21	-41	-78
David Dreyfus <sup>2</sup>	-	-	-	-	31
Andres Gräf	0	-11	63	-46	62
<b>Supervisory Board members</b>					
Stefan Brendgen	0	10	18	2	2
Dr Jochen Scharpe	1	10	14	-2	0
Marija Korsch <sup>3</sup>	-8	5	-	-	0
Dietmar P. Binkowska <sup>4</sup>	3	13	24	0	0
Thomas Hegel <sup>5,6</sup>	9	14	23	0	0
Christiane Jansen <sup>7</sup>	-	-	4	4	0
Stefan Mohr <sup>8</sup>	-	-	-	-	0
Sabine Georgi <sup>9</sup>	-	-	-	-	1
Average employee remuneration	7	0	7	-7	8
Net income/loss for the year of Instone Real Estate Group SE (under HGB individual financial statement)	-17	369	-50	-33	69
Adjusted EAT (under IFRS consolidated financial statements)	-61	136	-48	-4	-24

<sup>1</sup> Member of the Management Board from 1 January 2019 to 31 July 2023.

<sup>2</sup> Member of the Management Board since 1 September 2023.

<sup>3</sup> Board members resigned during the year in 2021. Value extrapolated to the entire calendar year 2021.

<sup>4</sup> Board members joined during the year 2019. Value extrapolated to the entire calendar year 2019.

<sup>5</sup> Board members joined during the year 2019. Value extrapolated to the entire calendar year 2019.

<sup>6</sup> Board members resigned during the year in 2023. Value extrapolated to the entire calendar year 2023.

<sup>7</sup> Board members joined during the year 2021. Value extrapolated to the entire calendar year 2021.

<sup>8</sup> Member of the Supervisory Board since 14 June 2023.

<sup>9</sup> Member of the Supervisory Board since 3 July 2023.

## Acknowledgment of the remuneration report

### REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR ON THE AUDIT OF THE REMUNERATION REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 162 (3) AKTG

To Instone Real Estate Group SE, Essen/Germany

#### Audit Opinion

We conducted a formal audit of the remuneration report of Instone Real Estate Group SE for the financial year from 1 January to 31 December 2024 to assess whether the disclosures required under Section 162 (1) and (2) German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) have been made in the remuneration report. In accordance with Section 162 (3) AktG, we have not audited the content of the remuneration report.

In our opinion, the disclosures required under Section 162 (1) and (2) AktG have been made, in all material respects, in the accompanying remuneration report. Our audit opinion does not cover the content of the remuneration report.

#### Basis for the Audit Opinion

We conducted our audit of the remuneration report in accordance with Section 162 (3) AktG and in compliance with the IDW Auditing Standard: Audit of the Remuneration Report pursuant to Section 162 (3) AktG (IDW AuS 870 (09.2023)). Our responsibilities under those requirements and this standard are further described in the "Auditor's Responsibilities" section of our report. Our audit firm has applied the requirements of the IDW Quality Management Standards. We have fulfilled our professional responsibilities in accordance with the German Public Auditor Act (WPO) and the Professional Charter for German Public Auditors and German Sworn Auditors (BS WP/vBP) including the requirements on independence.

#### Responsibilities of the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board

The executive board and the supervisory board are responsible for the preparation of the remuneration report, including the related disclosures, that complies with the requirements of Section 162 AktG. In addition, they are responsible for such internal control as they have determined necessary to enable the preparation of a remuneration report, including the related disclosures, that are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud (i.e. fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets) or error.

#### Auditor's Responsibilities

Our objective is to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the disclosures required under Section 162 (1) and (2) AktG have been made, in all material respects, in the remuneration report, and to express an opinion on this in a report on the audit.

We planned and conducted our audit in such a way to be able to determine whether the remuneration report is formally complete by comparing the disclosures made in the remuneration report with the disclosures required under Section 162 (1) and (2) AktG. In accordance with Section 162 (3) AktG, we have neither audited the correctness of the content of the disclosures, nor the completeness of the content of the individual disclosures, nor the adequate presentation of the remuneration report.

Düsseldorf/Germany, 10 March 2025

**Deloitte GmbH**  
Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft

Signed: Rolf Künemann  
Wirtschaftsprüfer  
(German Public Auditor)

Signed: Nicole Meyer  
Wirtschaftsprüferin  
(German Public Auditor)